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This thesis analyzes burden sharing issues of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. Explanations of economic principles including
public goods theory, disproportionality, free riding, marginalism,
and opportunity cost provide a common base of knowledge necessary
for an intelligent discussion of burden sharing in defense
alliances
.
The thesis concentrates on the problems associated with
quantifying benefits, costs and equity issues in multilateral force
actions like Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In particular,
it analyzes the Persian Gulf oil supply security benefit and
evaluates the efficacy of various oil benefit measures.
Current cost estimates and cost reports focus on legitimizing
supplemental funding. They do not capture all of the incremental
costs appropriate for burden sharing. This thesis examines the
critical differences between incremental burden sharing costs and
the costs that were reported to satisfy congressional budget
deliberation
.
Recommendations focus on ways for the U.S. to implement the
financial lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
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Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm has established a new
level of allied cooperation, including significant financial
burden sharing by an unprecedented number of countries. The
Administration and the Department of Defense (DoD) have both
stated that emphasis should be focused on our capability to
respond to more of these regional conflicts in the future.
This emphasis was confirmed by President Bush during his
August 2, 1990 "new strategy" speech in Aspen, Colorado. It
was also confirmed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in their
congressional testimony on the FY 92-93 Defense Budget.
Assuming that these regional conflicts are indeed the
threat of the future, the burden sharing precedents that are
set as a result of the Persian Gulf War will certainly have
far-reaching implications . Establishing clear, understandable
guidelines to handle burden sharing issues in the years ahead
are undoubtedly important policy considerations.
The purpose of this thesis is to stress the significance
of economic principles to appropriately estimate the true
costs of U.S. involvement in regional conflicts, like
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, from a burden sharing
perspective. This emphasizes the fact that there are critical
differences between cost estimates for burden sharing purposes
and cost estimates used to justify Congressional funding.
B . OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are fourfold:
1. Provide a clear explanation of the major economic
concepts underlying burden sharing issues critical to a
full understanding of defense alliances.
2. Underscore the difficulties associated with measuring
benefits and contributions appropriate for assessing
equity in the distribution of the defense burden (using
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm specifics as an
example for future applications) . In particular, develop
an appropriate proxy for evaluating the oil supply
security benefit.
3. Distinguish between the various interpretations of
incremental costs desired for cost estimates and cost
reports for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
4. Develop recommendations to help prepare the U.S. for




Can financial cost estimates and cost reports for
regional conflicts, such as the Persian Gulf War,





Which underlying economic principles should be
considered in determining cost estimates for burden
sharing purposes?
2. Why is disproportionality such a major issue of
contention in defense alliances?
3. What were the major benefits and contributions to
consider for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm?
4. What primary problems were encountered in analyzing
costs and contributions during Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm?
5. Are current proxies used to assess equity accurate and
appropriate?
6. Did the U.S. set clear guidance as to the types of
costs desired for cost estimates and cost reports for
the operation?
7. Are different cost estimates required for burden
sharing than were used for justifying supplemental
funding?
8. What were the impacts of the operation for burden
sharing issues that involve Congress, defense policy
and the U.S. economy?
9. What lessons can be learned from Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm to enhance burden sharing efforts
in future multinational regional conflicts?
D . SCOPE
This thesis is a case study recommending the appropriate
use of economic principles for estimating the U.S. costs of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm for burden sharing
purposes. Assuming that similar types of ad hoc coalitions
are probable in the future, this thesis emphasizes the
distinction between costs for burden sharing applications and
costs reflected in cost estimates, cost reports, and
supplemental funding requests for Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. Recognizing the concern for equitable
burden sharing in this type of defense alliance, the thesis
explains the difficulties in measuring the relative benefits
and contributions of participants, clarifies confusing issues
concerning the inappropriate use of proxies, and stresses the
need to focus on making the overall process more equitable.
This thesis does not attempt to estimate actual costs
incurred during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, nor does
it attempt to determine the equitable amount of burden that
should be shared by members of the coalition forces,
individually or collectively. This thesis does not compare
the various budgetary cost estimates that have already been
established by the Department of Defense (DoD) , the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) , the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) , the General Accounting Office (GAO) , the U.S. House of
Representatives Appropriations Committee (HAC) and other
sources. Nor does it examine the legitimacy of specific
estimates or the validity of the actual methodologies used to
calculate the specific dollar amounts.
E . ASSUMPTIONS
In the wake of such astonishing global events as the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Communist Party in
the Soviet Union, the United States finds itself as the only
remaining world "super power." Prior to the end of the Cold
War, there was a certain stability that pervaded world events
because two super powers (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) opposed
one another. With the fall of Soviet dominance comes less
control over formerly allied volatile nations. With
irrational, immoral leaders, like Saddam Hussein, the world is
more unstable than ever before.
This thesis assumes that U.S. defense policy will continue
to place increased emphasis on involvement in regional
conflicts necessary to protect U.S. interests. A careful
analysis of the burden sharing issues of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm will have significant implications for
similar multinational regional conflicts in the future.
F . METHODOLOGY
The research data for this thesis was collected in a
number of ways. Extensive background reading in defense
policy and economics was required to establish a sound base of
knowledge from which to intelligently begin discussion. In
addition to published books and academic studies, numerous
reports issued by Congress, DoD, and various government
agencies on burden sharing and costs of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm were included in the literature review.
In particular, the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
supplemental appropriations bills, their corresponding
congressional testimonies, and several reports on burden
sharing issues from the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
were thoroughly examined.
A research trip to Washington, D.C., in late July proved
essential to the success of the research efforts. Interviews
were held with high-ranking officials within the Department of
the Navy Comptroller Office (NAVCOMPT) , the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) (specifically the International
Security Policy, Comptroller, and International Economic and
Energy Affairs offices) , GAO (specifically the National
Security and International Affairs Division) , CBO, OMB (Deputy
Director's office), as well as with senior staffers on the HAC
minority and the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)
minority and majority. These interviews provided invaluable
insight to the actual processes used and their application, as
well as the politics involved throughout the process.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II discusses the underlying economic concepts
essential to clearly understand burden sharing in defense
alliances, and examines the dilemma of accurately measuring
equity among the burden sharing participants.
Chapter III analyzes benefits associated with Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The oil supply security benefit
is examined in greatest detail to evaluate its significance
and to develop an appropriate proxy to measure coalition
member's proportionality for burden sharing concerns.
Chapter IV discusses the various types of coalition
contributions. Fulfillment of pledge commitments is addressed
and collection of pledges is discussed.
Chapter V clarifies the confusion resulting from different
interpretations as to what to include as "incremental costs"
for U.S. cost estimates, cost reports, and supplemental
funding requests for the Persian Gulf crisis.
Chapter VI concludes this thesis by reemphasizing the
major objectives and providing recommendations to help prepare
the U.S. for burden sharing issues in future regional
conflicts and multinational coalitions.
II. UNDERLYING ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
A. GENERAL
Before analyzing the Desert Shield/Desert Storm cost
estimates, the economic concepts upon which the burden sharing
perspective is based must be understood. 1
Undoubtedly, many people will find exception to such a
reliance on economic principles. This is fully expected and
understandable since application of economic concepts in the
public arena is often difficult and many times counter to
political objectives. However, economics provides the most
appropriate base of knowledge to intelligently discuss burden
sharing issues.
B. EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
Defense burden sharing concerns the division of
responsibility and benefits among the members of a common
defense alliance, where the alliance can be both formal or
informal. The common perception is that financial and
leadership responsibility should be divided so that the
alliance is efficient (provides the given level of total
defense for the minimum possible cost) and the relative
1 This discussion of the major economic concepts
underlying burden sharing issues relies heavily on "Burden
Sharing: An Introduction to the Issues" by William R. Gates,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April, 1989.
burdens are equitable (there is a balance between the costs
and benefits for each member nation)
.
Unfortunately, efficiency and equity are difficult to
define and measure. In addition, individuals usually focus on
their own self interests before concerning themselves with the
well being of the alliance as a whole. As a result,
efficiency tends to be ignored in most discussions and equity
becomes the most important consideration for burden sharing
situations. Therefore, there is a need to consider the
dynamics of defense alliances to determine if equity is
possible.
C. PUBLIC GOODS
Defense is a classic example of a "public good." There
are two characteristics that distinguish these goods from
typical goods. First, the good can be consumed simultaneously
by more than one consumer without affecting the utility that
any of the other consumers receive from the good. These goods
are called "joint consumption goods" and are said to be "non-
rivalrous" in consumption. Second, it is typically hard to
exclude individuals from consuming the goods provided, even if
they have not paid for the good. This property is referred to
as "non-excludability . " Goods that are both non-rivalrous and
non-excludable are "public goods."
The economic theory of alliances is based on public goods
theory. If alliance members share common objectives and also
honor their alliance commitment, mutual defense is both non-
rivalrous and non-excludable to all alliance members (and many
non-members). All resources deployed to the alliance's best
advantage provide public benefits. Publicness is based on the
commonality of the alliance's and the members' objectives and
the degree to which resources contribute to the common
objective, irrespective of the specific objectives of each
member or each members level of contribution.
D. FREE RIDING
Once a public good has been provided, the benefits are
available to all members. As a result, if the "public good"
is provided through voluntary participation, each individual
can purposely reduce his or her own contribution and rely on
the contributions of others. In other words, each member has
a tendency to "free ride". Free riding reduces the total
quantity of a public good provided and shifts the burden of
cost to those individuals who value the public good most
highly. It also shifts the burden to individual members who
have capacity and comparative advantage of providing the
public good. Predicting the presence of free riding and the
resulting sub-optimal quantity of defense goods has been
economics' primary contribution to the on-going burden sharing
debate. To the extent defense alliances provide public goods,
the U.S. can be expected to bear a disproportionate share of
the defense burden.
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Because public goods theory suggests that equity in
defense alliances is unlikely, there is a great deal of
concern and desire to measure the contributions and benefits
associated with the alliance. Unfortunately, the difficulty
with measuring equity is substantial. As a result,
quantifiable proxies are relied upon to closely approximate
actual contributions and benefits. The focus then turns to
defining and defending a quantifiable measure of equity.
E. OPPORTUNITY COST AND MARGINALISM
The opportunity cost concept is simply an understanding
that any use of scarce (limited) resources will incur costs in
terms of foregone alternatives that can no longer be
undertaken elsewhere. DoD, facing a declining budget, is
dealing with very limited resources. Therefore, opportunity
cost becomes ever more relevant to DoD resource allocation
problems
.
A strict definition of economic marginalism is the cost or
benefit associated with the production or consumption of one
additional unit. In relation to defense, where one additional
unit is not well defined and difficult to measure, marginalism
becomes equated with incremental cost. Therefore, it entails
looking strictly at the additional costs and benefits
associated with a particular option or contingency.
Efficiency, an important concern of every burden sharing
debate, requires that the marginal costs and the sum of the
11
marginal benefits of each burden sharing member be balanced.
Therefore, for burden sharing purposes in defense alliances,
the marginal (incremental) costs are the appropriate costs
measure
.
F. DISPROPORTIONALITY: THE PRIMARY BURDEN SHARING COMPLAINT
1 . Measuring Costs and Benefits
The true burden of war includes human, military and
political, as well as financial components. "Fairness" in
defense burden sharing often connotes some kind of
proportionality between benefits and costs. However,
voluntary transaction involving public goods typically results
in a disproportionate distribution of costs among the
participants. Even the optimal distribution, which maximizes
the total welfare when each participant counts equally,
generally results in a disproportionate cost distribution.
This is due to the existence of the comparative advantage
involving public goods and to the diverse economic
capabilities measured in terms of GNP . If we are to ensure
proportionality in costs and benefits, we must give a higher
welfare weight to the country with a larger GNP, and to a
country with more efficient public good production capability.
Then the effort to provide "fairness" (i.e., proportionate
burden share) actually leads to a truly inequitable action.
12
All defense alliance members argue that the defense
burden should be distributed fairly, yet a "fair" distribution
is never definable. There is no clear yardstick to use in
determining if the burden is distributed fairly. Given the
current secular preoccupation to equate proportionality with
fairness, each participant has an incentive to overstate his
or her contribution and to understate his or her benefits.
a . Quantifiable Proxies
To circumvent a lack of a proper equity measure,
the burden sharing debate has historically relied on easily
quantifiable proxies. Several different measures have been
suggested and can be grouped into two general categories
:
input measures and output measures. Unfortunately, the
politics involved force the burden sharing debate to rapidly
degenerate into a measurement argument, as each country can
select the measure that best supports their position.
(1) Input Measures. There are proponents and
critics for every conceivable measure of input. Two of the
most common measures are expenditures as a percent of GNP and
per capita defense spending. Although these measures both
have their strong points, they fail to consider several
important but hard to quantify factors. These factors
include: the value of land provided rent-free for U.S. bases
in allied countries; the differing levels of funding for
economic assistance which helps reduce tensions in the regions
13
of conflict; the market value of military manpower in those
countries that rely on a draft system (although the quality of
these troops is also debatable) / the psychological and
emotional costs of hosting foreign military troops; the
differing levels of technology and productive efficiency
across countries; and the efficiency of the mix of resources
a country provides
.
(2) Output Measures. In ad hoc coalitions such
as Desert Shield/Desert Storm, many people feel that burden
sharing should be based on defense capabilities rather than
expenditures. Quantifiable proxies for defense capabilities
include defense personnel (including ground, naval and air
forces) , airlift and sealift capabilities, military equipment,
and various support. However, critics argue that defense
output measures do not include several factors that affect the
real value of a contribution: capability of troops and
equipment (including availability of required logistics
supplies, spares, and ammunition) ; ability to mobilize
(location of troops and equipment) ; capability to resupply
(surge capability) ; and troop training, leadership, and
morale. These more qualitative factors are clearly difficult





There are three main
shortcomings of proxies for defense burdens: the measures
tend to ignore benefits; there is disagreement as to what
defense-related expenditures should be included; and it is not
obvious as to how to adjust burdens based on ability to pay.
Several primary and secondary benefits that
should be considered are difficult to quantify and therefore
usually ignored. As a result, both the input measures and the
output measures have typically focused on contributions.
Without measuring benefits, it is impossible to determine if
a country's benefits received are unequal relative to
contributions. Claims of inequity based solely on a
comparison of relative contributions without considering
benefits received can lead to inappropriate conclusions.
The second area of disagreement is
determining which defense related expenditures to include as
part of a country's contributions to the allied defense
effort. Some defense expenditures are committed directly and
some indirectly to the allied effort. Several direct defense
contributions are omitted in official measures of defense
expenditures, including the value of property donated for
foreign bases and training exercises, the true value of
conscription forces, and foreign aid. There are also indirect
contributions stemming from the quality of the resources
provided that are equally difficult to quantify and omitted
from official measures. In addition, the distinction between
15
the two is often not clear cut. Whether to include
expenditures in these cases is understandably an area of
debate. Also, there is debate over the definition of military
expenditure. Depending on what is allowable under the strict
definition for the coalition, different countries will be
represented as greater contributors
.
The last problem with proxies used to
determine equity is that equity is defined in different ways.
Some would argue for each member to contribute at an equal
rate, such as per cent of GNP . Others firmly support that the
most equitable process would rely on a progressive rate based
on a member's ability to pay (typically determined by using
GNP). The U.S. income tax system provides the most common
example where a wealthier individual is required to devote a
higher percentage of his or her income. If a coalition
member' s GNP increased or if their comparative advantage
increased, they would then be expected to contribute at a
higher rate. The two differences in opinion underscore that
equity agreement is often impossible.
Jb. Measuring Dlsproportionality Is Impossible
In any defense alliance burden sharing situation,
there is a great deal of concern over determining whether or
not any countries are bearing a disproportionate share of the
burden. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, identifying free
16
riders requires a comparison of the ratios of costs to
benefits for each member.
To further complicate the issue, each country's
appraisal of the benefits depends on a number of factors,
including the value placed on the benefit and the country's
perception of the degree of the threat. [Ref. 1] The
same problems apply to valuing contributions. These numerous
measurement problems make it impossible to develop a single,
objective disproportionality index. Although some analysts
have combined similar groups of countries together, which
makes comparative analysis a little easier, comparisons across
groups are dubious since they require comparing dissimilar
costs and benefits.
As a result, disproportionality indices tend to
focus on simplified descriptions of costs and benefits for
which quantifiable proxies can be developed. Current proxies
often ignore important factors such as ability to pay,
perception of the degree of the threat, and intangible
contributions. Although proxies are currently the only way to
adequately approximate equity in burden sharing scenarios,
there is still room for improvement. It must be remembered
that there are advantages and disadvantages to each proxy, and
in some cases, a particular proxy can be strategically chosen
to support a desired political objective rather than an
impartial economic outcome. The measurement problems
17
discussed above make it impossible to construct an objective
disproportionality index that is universally accepted.
18
III. THE BENEFITS OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM2
As stated previously, in order for coalition countries to
feel that the defense burden for Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm was apportioned equitably, each member
must feel that the ratio of costs to benefits of participation
was the same for each country. Unfortunately, as would be
expected, measuring equity for the operation is especially
difficult because the costs and benefits to each country vary
greatly. For ease of analysis, this thesis considered the
following commonly discussed benefits: preserving national
sovereignty, increasing regional and international stability,
and ensuring the security of the Middle East oil supply. 3
A. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
National sovereignty is one obvious benefit that can be
direct or indirect. Kuwait was the prime beneficiary of
direct national sovereignty, receiving direct protection from
2 This section of the thesis is based heavily on "Burden
Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications
for the Future" by William R. Gates and Katsuaki L. Terasawa,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1992.
3 This thesis treats the benefits discussed as purely
public benefits. For a more detailed analysis distinguishing
public from private benefits based on the degree to which
defense resources are committed to the alliance, see
"Commitment, Threat Perceptions and Expenditures in a Defense
Alliance" by William R. Gates and Katsuaki L. Terasawa,
International Studies Quarterly , 1992.
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the coalition. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates also directly benefitted, though to a lesser
degree. However, numerous other countries also benefitted
that were not directly threat L by Iraq. These countries
are in a position very conducive to free riding.
Operation Desert Storm also served to increase the
perception that there is a credible commitment of larger
nations to protect smaller nations, both formally or
informally allied. Perceived commitment has a great deal of
impact on the value placed on both costs and benefits. 4 Many
persons agree that because this perceived commitment
increases, the necessity of this type of action in the future
will decrease. 5 The United States and some of the other
Western European countries receive a benefit of indirect
national sovereignty by acting in the role of "world
policemen" because the necessity of having to protect other
countries in the future is reduced. Assuming that the U.S. is
restructuring Defense Department capabilities toward the new
4 Further discussion on the impacts of credibility of
commitments to an alliance can be found in "Commitment, Threat
Perceptions and Expenditures in a Defense Alliance", William
R. Gates and Katsuaki L. Terasawa, International Studies
Quarterly , 1992.
5 President Bush acknowledged this U.S. national
sovereignty benefit at a news conference on March 1, 1991.
According to President Bush, victory in the Persian Gulf
reduces the risk that the U.S. will have to go into battle of
this type someplace else in the future. (Gates and Terasawa,
"Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and
Implications for the Future", 1992)
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post-Cold War threat, the U.S. would definitely benefit from
any decrease in the possibility of regional conflicts.
B. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY
The Persian Gulf has never been known for its stability.
The area's marked instability can be attributed to several
factors too numerous to discuss here, but the fact that
reducing that instability would definitely provide benefits to
many countries warrants discussion.
By invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's was taking another
step towards establishing Iraq as the dominant power in the
region. Timely U.S. intervention was necessary because if
Hussein had taken control of all Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) oil, the resultant accumulation of wealth and political
leverage would have enabled him to increase his military power
and capabilities. The regional conflict could have rapidly
escalated to an explosive Israel/Palestine issue. The U.S.
clearly had to take action. To have ignored the crisis longer
would have potentially made the costs of intervention
tremendously more expensive. The successful actions of the
coalition forces thwarted Hussein's plans and thereby provided
varying benefits to the coalition nations.
The benefits vary depending on each nation's perception of
the desired regional order and on their feeling towards
foreign (particularly Western) intervention. The oil-rich
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states probably received the
21
greatest benefit because not only did they favor maintaining
the status quo in the region, but they also had previous ties
with the U.S. and therefore most likely had less problems with
U.S. intervention. 6 There are other countries, such as Syria
and Egypt, that also benefit from seeing Iraq's regional power
reduced. While they might have preferred seeing the invasion
of Kuwait resolved using regional forces, both have ties with
the GCC and the U.S., and are therefore less likely to be
adamantly opposed to western participation (especially when it
was as effective as it was)
.
It is easy to imagine that if the Iraq invasion had spread
beyond Kuwait into other countries, many more nations would
have been directly and indirectly affected. The value of
benefits associated with preventing this Iraqi aggression
depends on the perception of this threat widening to a truly
international conflict. 7 Because this value would also have
6 After the 197 9 Iranian revolution, Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. and the GCC
established military ties. Regional sensitivities precluded
overt military ties, but the U.S. received limited permission
to use military facilities in Bahrain and Oman (and Egypt)
.
More importantly, Saudi Arabia established a $50 billion Gulf-
wide air defense system, built to U.S. and NATO
specifications. This system included Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) planes and several bases, some
designated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with stocks of
fuel, parts and munitions. The U.S. intended to provide
front-line forces in any crises, after a public invitation
from the area's ruling families. (Gates and Terasawa, 1992.)
An in-depth analysis on the effects of threat
perceptions can be found in "Commitment, Threat Perceptions
and Expenditures in a Defense Alliance", William R. Gates and
Katsuaki L. Terasawa, International Studies Quarterly , 1992.
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to include the political and economical costs of each and
every country's involvement and the impact of international
instability on international trade, it is virtually impossible
to assess and will therefore not be discussed further.
C. OIL SUPPLY SECURITY
Although national sovereignty and regional and
international stability are extremely difficult to measure,
the oil supply security benefit, though just as complex, is a
little more tangible. However, the emphasis that most people
put on the tremendous degree of benefit gained by guaranteeing
oil supply security is greatly overestimated. 8
The most common perception is that the countries most
reliant on Persian Gulf oil would gain the most benefit from
ensuring the oil supply. Unfortunately, it is inappropriate
to associate the value of the oil supply security benefit with
reliance on Persian Gulf oil. Because the world oil market is
an integrated market, disruptions in supplies from Iraq and
Kuwait will impact more countries than just consumers relying
heavily on those two suppliers. The oil supply security
benefit's economic value is actually related to the impact
that world oil prices have on current and future Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) . Sharp oil price increases tend to
8 Discussion of the oil supply security benefit is based
heavily on Gates and Terasawa, "Burden Sharing in the Persian
Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications for the Future", Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1992.
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cause recessions. The length of the recession is directly
related to the length of the price increase. If price
increases are temporary, the effect on GDP is also temporary.
The impact of world oil prices on GDP is related to three
factors: the impact on consumption, aggregate supply, and
investment. The consumption effect is related to oil imports.
Aggregate consumption is determined by national income. World
oil price increases transfer income from oil importing to oil
exporting countries. The aggregate supply effects are the
same for both oil importers and exporters. Sharp oil price
increases reduce aggregate supply for all countries. Finally,
assuming no change in the nominal money supply, increases in
oil prices reduce real money balances for oil importing
countries, thus increasing interest rates and reducing
aggregate investment
.
The overall impact depends on the overall balance of these
reactions. In particular, the consumption impact depends on
the share of imported (exported) oil in GDP, the aggregate
supply impact depends on share of oil consumption in GDP, and
the investment impact depends on sensitivity of both interest
rates to the demand for money and of investment to interest
rates. The net balance of these effects will vary across
countries
.
The U.S. Senate Budget Committee commendably attempted to
use benefits within its measurement criteria when it equated
benefits from Operation Desert Storm to percentage dependence
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on Persian Gulf oil imports. However, the results of their
measurements must be caveated. Because the use of different
proxies can often present different results, the door is open
to possible manipulation. Whether the Senate Budget
Committee's choice was more of a strategic one than one of
naivety, their results serve a political purpose of
representing the U.S. as sharing a disproportionate share of
the burden. Figure l 9 shows the Senate's view. However, the
simplicity of their estimate is probably misleading.
^ Coalition Personnel
Gulf Oil Dependence
Japan Germany France Italy U.K.
Figure 1. U.S. Senate's View: Gulf Oil Dependence vs Personnel Contributed
'Source: Senate Budget Committee, "Review and Analysis
of President Bush's 1992 Budget", February 6, 1991, p. 23.
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Generalizations that sharp oil price increases have a
greater impact on countries relying more heavily on imported
oil may be wrong. In fact, the value of the oil supply
security benefit depends on the country's elasticity of GDP
with respect to changes in oil prices.
Figure 2 10 is a simulation that compares the impact to
GNP from increased oil prices for a 100% oil importer, such as
Japan, a 50% oil importer, similar to the U.S., and a 0% oil
importer (a net oil exporter), such as Kuwait. The simulation
shows that if GNP is more sensitive to oil price increases for
the 50% importer than for the 100% importer, the decrease in
GNP is actually greater for the 50% importer.
"Source: Gates and Terasawa, "Burden Sharing in the
Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications for the
Future", Naval Postgraduate School, 1992.
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Note for the simulation:
1. Oil is only produced by Country 2 and 3, while non-oil products are only
produced by Country 1 and 2.
2. The production functions for non-oil products are assumed as follows :
Ql=Zi02, and Q2=0.9 Z>2 - %i denotes amount of oil required for this
production.
3. The utility functions in the three countries are assumed to be the same
and are given by: Ui= Xi^^Yj^^ for i=l,23- Xj denotes final oil
consumption by Country i, and Y| denotes final consumption of non-oil
products.
4. Oil resources for Coynl/y 2 is given by R2=7.5. Oil resources for Country
3 is given by R^=10. This amount, however, is reduced by one half to
Simulate, the supply interruption.
Figure 2. Simulation of Oil Price Increase on ONP
Figure 3 11 shows the results of an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) study using more reasonable, realistic assumptions
that supports the simulation in Figure 2. Dependence is
irrelevant to how GNP is affected. The energy price
elasticity of GNP, and not per cent dependence, is what is
significant. This confirms that using strict dependence on
ii
34-35.
Source: World Economic Outlook , October, 1990, IMF, pp
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Persian Gulf oil as a proxy to measure burden sharing














Gulf Oil Dependence Reduction in GNP
Figure 3. IMF Study of 50% Price Increase on GNP
Given a country's elasticity of GDP with respect to oil
price, the value of the oil supply security benefit is
measured by comparing expected world oil prices with and
without coalition intervention. As it turns out, the long run
increase in the price of oil is roughly the same, with or
without coalition intervention. Assuming that Iraq clearly
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Assuming that Iraq clearly wanted to raise oil prices 12
,
there are many reasons to expect that an Iraqi monopoly of the
Persian Gulf oil supply would have resulted in a price
increase that would be limited and temporary.
One reason for the lack of permanency is that price
increases become counter-productive after a point. In the
short run, consumers begin conserving oil and looking for
alternative energy sources. In addition, world GDP falls. In
the long run, alternate energy technologies are developed.
Both these reactions reduce oil consumption. Oil price
increases can actually reduce oil revenues if the quantity
demanded falls sufficiently.
There is also a supply side response. Higher oil prices
encourage other oil producers to increase output in the short
run. In the long run, expansion of existing oil production
facilities and exploration for new reserves is encouraged.
These responses put further downward pressure on world oil
prices
.
12 An oil price dispute was the reason Iraq initially
offered for invading Kuwait. In early 1990, Iraq lobbied OPEC
to raise oil prices to $20 per barrel. This request was
denied, and oil prices fell to as low as $14 per barrel. Iraq
alleged that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were involved
in a Washington-encouraged conspiracy to depress world oil
prices by exceeding their OPEC sanctioned production quotas,
thereby destroying Iraq economically and diminishing its
regional power. Iraq's adherence to its claim eventually
culminated in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. (Gates and Terasawa,
"Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and
Implications for the Future", 1992)
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In fact, temporary increases in world oil prices because
of coalition intervention may have been more severe than if
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (and possibly the rest of the Gulf
Cooperation Council states) had been unchallenged. After the
embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, oil prices increased due to
the combined effects of reduced supply and speculative demand.
It is unlikely that Iraq would have reduced world oil supply
to this extent, so the supply impact would have been less. In
addition, although the prices would have increased a little,
the presence of at least some Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil exports
may have reduced speculative demand, further mitigating the
price increase.
Much of the general public perceived the primary oil
supply security benefit for Operation Desert Storm as
destruction of Iraq's ability to raise long run oil prices.
However, even without coalition intervention, long run oil
price increases, as discussed above, would have been
improbable. Figure 4 13 shows that the price of oil, in the
long run, is roughly the same with or without coalition
intervention against Iraq. The normal price of oil prior to
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was $15 to $17 per
barrel. The actual market price of oil during the operation
climbed to as high as $32 per barrel, but eventually decreased
back to a normal level. Using estimates derived from oil
13 Source: Love, James P., "Costs of the U.S. War with
Iraq", Public Citizen, February 5, 1991, p. 26.
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production and supply data provided by the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) , the estimated price increases due to the
international sanctions are also shown. Had Iraq been left
alone to take over Kuwait, and possibly even Saudi Arabia,
prices would have similarly been raised initially but, as
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Figure 4. Effects on the Long-Run Price of Oil
Although ensuring oil supply security is a benefit of the
Gulf War, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm probably only
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had a minor impact on oil supply security worldwide.
Particular countries' dependance on oil is not critical to
world oil market security. Figure 5 14 shows changes in total
world oil production during the first five months of the
Persian Gulf Crisis to be minimal. In fact, net world oil
production actually increased by November, 1990. Many people
were quick to jump to the conclusion that the U.S. absolutely
had to intervene in the annexation of Kuwait to prevent Iraq
from drastically increasing the long run price of oil. This
justification, though publicly popular, is dubious.
Measuring benefits, as seen above, can be terribly
complex. Attempts to measure equity in previous situations
have historically relied solely on measuring relative
contributions. However, it is clear that the most appropriate
method to measure equity in burden sharing issues must also
account for relative benefits
.
"Source: International Petroleum Statistics, EIA,
Department of Energy (DOE)
.
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Production changes as a % of July 1991 world total
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Figure 5. World Oil Production Recovery
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IV. CONTRIBUTIONS OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
The costs to each of the coalition members of
participating in Desert Storm are best represented by




Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the
commencement of Operation Desert Shield, President Bush sent
Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and
Secretary of the Treasury Brady to the Persian Gulf, Europe,
and East Asia to obtain commitments to offset U.S. military
costs in the Gulf region and to provide economic assistance to
countries affected by the embargo. Congress fully supported
the President's decision to seek additional monetary and non-
monetary contributions from the allies, not only to increase
the other coalition countries' share of the cost of the
operation, but to promote the opportunity to fund the cost of
the war for the United States. Congress saw that this would
directly reduce the level of supplemental appropriations
necessary to cover U.S. costs, which would be very popular
with the taxpayers.
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These "Tin Cup" 15 missions targeted industrialized
nations that had not sent military personnel to the Gulf and
oil rich Arab monarchs that the U.S. was protecting. The
initial round of solicitations produced commitments of roughly
$9.7 billion for U.S. military costs and over $10 billion for
economic support for front line and other counties. By
January, after the outbreak of hostilities and a second round
of allied requests, and as a result of the outbreak of
hostilities, fifty countries had either pledged or contributed
some type of support. The financial and in-kind
contributions totalled to roughly $54 billion.
Measuring each country' s contribution is extremely
difficult because the pledges and contributions varied widely
in content. Contributions and pledges included military
forces, cash donations to the U.S. Treasury, in-kind
assistance, economic aid to countries affected by the crisis,
host nation support to coalition troops in the Gulf region and
other more intangible types of support.
1 . Military Forces
During the Persian Gulf crisis, 36 countries sent
ground, air, and naval forces or support units to the Persian
Gulf. [Ref . 3] Coalition countries had committed over
245,000 troops, 64 warships, 650 combat aircraft and 950
15 The term "Tin Cup" was used by Dave Tarbell, Director
of International Economic Affairs, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, in an interview on July 24, 1991.
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tanks. [Ref. 4] Although these military force
contributions significantly enhanced the defense capabilities
of the coalition, the financial value of military forces is
not included in any of the contribution reports. Issues of
quality of vehicles and quality of troops provided
(conscription forces versus all-volunteer militaries) further




Cash pledges and contributions were a major concern to
the U.S. Therefore, they were tracked meticulously. The FY
91 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental required monthly
reports to Congress on the pledges made and received. Allied
cash and in-kind contributions from the first seven OMB
reports, as required by Congress, from March through September
1991 are summarized by amount and by percentage in Figure
6. 16 As an example, the seventh required report, dated
September 16, 1991, is included as Appendix A.
3 . Host Nation Support
Host nation support from Saudi Arabia included fuel,
food, water, housing, building materials, local transportation
and port handling services. Valuating Saudi Arabia's host
nation support was especially uncertain because, unlike other
countries that pledged a specific amount, the Saudis made an









Figure 6. Allied Cash and In-Kind Contributions
open-end commitment to support U.S. forces. Saudi Arabia also
committed to funding transportation for U.S. forces travelling
to the Gulf from Europe and the U.S.
The windfall profiteering reports made against our
Arab coalition partners (especially Saudi Arabia) were
overestimated. Although Saudi Arabia experienced substantial
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increased revenues due to the increase in oil prices , host
nation support to coalition forces, aid to the front line
states and other affected nations, and investment to expand
oil production capacity mitigated their profits. It is still
true, however, that Saudi Arabia made some profit from
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. What is not true is
that Saudi Arabia was necessarily the nation that was guilty
of the greatest net profit from the operation. Figure 7 17
shows the net contributions (total contributions including
cash, in-kind, and economic assistance minus increased
revenues) for some of the countries affected by the Persian
Gulf Crisis. Saudi Arabia's contribution is not as large as
Figure 6 seemed to indicate. Additionally, Figure 7 assumes
that it cost Saudi Arabia $4 billion to increase their oil
production, as they have claimed. Had their cost been lower,
their net contribution to the operation could easily have been
negative (a net benefit) . United Arab Emirates (UAE) shared
a very similar position.
4 . In-Kind Assistance
In-kind assistance encompasses several types of
support, including host nation support. U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) and U.S. Transportation Command had the
responsibility for determining the value of in-kind support.
17 Source: OMB Desert Shield/Desert Storm Monthly Cost
Reports and International Petroleum Statistlcs r EIA, DOE.
38
Saudi Arabia Kuwait UAE Germany Japan Others
Figure 7. Coalition Net Contributions
Because they did not always have access to data on a country's
actual expenditures, the value assigned was estimated as
reasonably as possible using information provided verbally
from local suppliers, prices paid under previously held U.S.
contracts, and other standard U.S. cost factors. For example,
CENTCOM used a standard price per gallon to value fuel
supplied to U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia based on an average
price paid by DoD in September 1990 for jet
fuel.[Ref. 5] As another example, CENTCOM officials
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determined the value of food supplied to the U.S. troops in
Saudi Arabia based on the amount paid to contractors under
U.S. contracts before the Saudis assumed responsibility for
the contracts in November, 1990. [Ref. 6] The actual
amount paid by the Saudi government is unknown. For a
breakdown by country and by type of in-kind assistance, refer
to Appendix B. 18
There are actually two ways to value in-kind
assistance: budgetary and burden sharing. The focus of the
budgetary approach is to determine how much the U.S. saves as
an offset to supplemental funding from each type of assistance
received. This, in fact, seemed to be the focus of CENTCOM'
s
purpose, as the value of in-kind assistance was measured as it
was delivered. A more inclusive burden sharing approach would
focus on determining the value of the contribution to the
contributing country (i.e., the opportunity cost to the donor
country)
.
18 Source: OMB Desert Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental
Act Supplementary Information, February 22, 1991, pp. 108-109.
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5 . Economic Aid
Economic aid consisted of assistance to front line
states (Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt) , Kuwait, Israel and others
.
The aid assisted nations suffering from the effects of
international economic sanctions against Iraq. It also
assisted in covering costs for refugees fleeing Iraq and
occupied Kuwait as well as for Kurdish refugees. The U.S.
forgave repayment of Egypt's $7 billion debt and is
considering giving substantial foreign aid to Israel and
Turkey, in particular, both of which stood by the U.S. during
the war. Of course, the opportunity cost of Egypt's debt
forgiveness can possibly be discounted because the debt may
never have been fully paid off. Although these impacts to
U.S. finances are a direct result of the Persian Gulf crisis,
they are not reflected on either cost reports or DoD cost
estimates of the full incremental costs of the war. A burden
sharing estimate would certainly include these additional
opportunity costs. The U.S. State and Treasury Departments
had more detailed information on the disbursements of these
contributions, but because the political sensitivity of the
data, it was unavailable for this thesis. A GAO summary of
economic assistance to front line states and other countries
is shown in Figure 8
.
In one of the most innovative burden sharing actions
for economic aid, President Bush established the Gulf Crisis
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Economic Assistance to Frontline States and Other Countries
(Dollars in millions)
1







Gulf States $6,168 $3,863 $3,636 $2,845 $9,804 $6,708 68%
Saudi Arabia 2,848 2,188 1,833 1,463 4,681 3,651 78%
Kuwait 2
r
500 855 1,184 763 3,684 1,618 44%
, UAE 820 820 619 619 1,439 1,439 100%
EC 3,039 1,225 177 1 3,216 1,226 38%
EC funds 805 624 805 624 78%
France 200 30 230 0%
Germany 1,195 462 137 1,332 462 35%
Italy 650 37 9 659 37 6%
Other EC b 189 102 1 1 190 103 54%
japan 2,126 803 481 2,607 803 31%
Others 413 112 99 62 512 174 34%
Korea 98 19 17 2 115 21 18%
Norway 24 7 82 60 106 67 63%
Switzerland 120 16 120 16 13%
Other c 171 70 171 70 41%
Total $11,746 $6,003 $4,393 $2,908 $16,139 $8,911 55%
SOURCE: Treasury Department, May 10, 1991
a Bangladesh, Djboutl, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Tunesia.
b Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom.
c Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden.
Figure 8. Summary of Economic Assistance
Financial Coordination Group (GCFCG) as an international
effort to provide financial assistance. The group coordinated
bilateral contributions from 24 donor countries, including GCC
members (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other oil rich Gulf
countries)
. Japan, Korea and several European
countries. [Ref. 7] If the GCFCG donors were to discontinue
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aid, the U.S. would be forced to assume a substantial size of
the aid burden which would obviously increase U.S. cost of
involvement in the Persian Gulf. Establishment of this type
of cooperative international organization for economic aid is
one example of the lessons learned from Operation Desert
Shield/ Desert Storm that would be wise to duplicate in the
future
.
6 . Other Support
In addition to all of the types of allied
contributions above, there are other contributions, not
included in the contribution reports, that should be
recognized. For example, Germany deployed a fighter squadron
to Turkey, ships to the eastern and central Mediterranean Sea,
and pledged about $2.7 billion in military assistance to
Turkey, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Similarly, Japan sent
oil booms to Saudi Arabia to assist in counteracting the Gulf
oil slick. [Ref . 8] To be fair in determining equity
of burden sharing, all contributions (above and beyond simply
financial and in-kind assistance) should be counted in tallies
of a country's total contributions, despite the measurement
difficulties involved.
Figures 9 and 10 show the totals of cash, in-kind, and
economic assistance attributed to coalition member countries
by dollar amount and percentage of total coalition assistance,
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respectively. 20 These figures do not include "other
assistance," as discussed above.
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Ute Germany Japan Others
Figure 9. Cash, In-Kind, and Economic Assistance by Dollar Amount
20 Source for Figure 9 and Figure 10








Saudi Arabia Kuwait Germany Japan Others
Figure 10. Member's Assistance as a Percentage of Total Coalition Assistance
B. COLLECTING ON ALLIED PLEDGES21
Burden sharing emerged as a major issue for Congress when
President Bush decided to enforce the United Nations-
sanctioned trade embargo of Iraq. The prospect that costs of
military operations in the Persian Gulf could eliminate the
"peace dividend, " hoped for from the decline in the Soviet
threat, created strong sentiment in Congress that the burdens
of the Iraq crisis should be shared internationally.
21 This discussion based heavily on "Iraq/Kuwait Crisis:
The International Response and Burdensharing Issues", Gary J.
Pagliano, CRS Report, June 26, 1991 and "The Persian Gulf War:
U.S. Costs and Allied Financial Contributions", Stephen
Daggett and Gary J. Pagliano, CRS Issue Brief, July 19, 1991.
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As projected U.S. costs grew larger, the burden sharing
issue became more heated. In fact, it was a central matter of
contention in the congressional debate over granting the
President authority to use force against Iraq. [Ref . 9]
Members of Congress were skeptical that promised pledges from
our coalition partners would materialize. As a result,
Congress acted to prohibit arms sales to nations that had not
fulfilled their commitments and withhold payments for
indirect-hire foreign nationals working at U.S. installations
abroad (the Secretary of Defense may still waive this last
provision) . These congressional actions were meant to
pressure the allies to fulfill their pledges.
Although commitment to pledges is critical, alienating
countries in our efforts to collect the pledges could have
severely detrimental effects in the future. This is
especially true if we admit that ad hoc coalitions will be the
mechanisms used to fight future regional conflicts.
Collecting from our coalition partners has actually been quite
successful, and the risk of offending countries with
significantly different cultures may not be worth the trouble.
Figure ll 22 indicates the degree to which pledges have been
fulfilled. Failure to exercise caution in this area could
serve the U.S a grave disinterest.









Figure 11. Fulfillment of Pledge Commitments
Another danger of pushing to hard for financial
compensation during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was
that U.S. forces could be seen as mercenaries for hire. In
this operation, however, it was the U.S. who initiated the
action without asking for financial support in advance and
without consulting many governments that were asked for
support. In future coalitions, the allies should not be
expected to provide substantial contributions without being
given a greater role in policies governing the purposes and
activities of the defense alliance. [Ref . 10]
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V. U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE OPERATION
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm represented an
unprecedented situation for the U.S. in which the need for
estimating costs and then accurately capturing actual costs
was required. Although the Desert Shield/Desert Storm costs
that were estimated and reported did not reflect all costs
appropriate for burden sharing purposes, the methodologies and
processes used could be a valuable base for assessing burden
sharing issues in the future.
A. INADEQUATE GUIDANCE LEADING TO CONFUSION BETWEEN COST
ESTIMATE PURPOSES
When the Military Departments were initially requested to
report the costs of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, they
were provided very little guidance by the Defense Department.
The March 1991 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Appropriations Bill required that OMB generate monthly cost
reports for Congress. These reports were to include the
incremental costs of the operation, separated into specific
appropriations accounts. The reports were also to include the
contributions made to the U.S. by each foreign country. The
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 provided that:
"Emergency Desert Shield costs mean those incremental
costs associated with the increase in operations in the
Middle East and do not include costs that would have been
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experienced by DoD as part of its normal operations absent
Operation Desert Shield."
This definition of incremental costs was basically accepted to
by all U.S. agencies (including DoD and OMB) and became the
basis for cost estimates and cost reports. The intent was
clearly one of justifying supplemental funding requirements.
Although this purpose is very applicable to budgetary cost
estimates, it can not be used to determine incremental costs
of the operation for burden sharing discussions. As a result,
the climate underlying all of the subsequent cost estimations
and reports was dominated by a budgetary emphasis. The only
burden sharing issues that received significant attention were
those of valuing in-kind assistance and tracking allied
pledges and financial contributions. These issues received
attention only because they helped finance the budgetary cost
of the operation. The documentation associated with the
request for supplemental appropriations simply did not
estimate the costs of the war. 22
The difference between the incremental costs of the war,
as reflected in the cost reports, and funding requirements for
supplemental appropriations is important. Funding
requirements represent outlays that the U.S will ultimately
For an extensive discussion on the budgetary
perspective of the operation, see "Cost Estimation of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Budgetary Analysis"
by Lcdr. Andrew Johnson, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, December, 1991.
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have to make. DoD and OMB reports of incremental costs
included not only actual expenditures, but also included
anticipated expenditures for which DoD has not actually
obligated funds. Anticipated expenditures include the
replacement of equipment destroyed in the war, deactivation of
Ready Reserve Fleet ships, and the restocking of Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS) . Some of these anticipated
expenditures in the DoD and OMB reports may never translate
into obligations because of future force reductions and the
austere budget climate that DoD faces for the
future. [Ref . 11]
In addition, the cost reports included the value of in-
kind assistance as part of actual expenditures. Although
appropriate for the full incremental costs that were included
in the Congress-required cost reports, in-kind assistance is
not accounted for in supplemental funding requests since the
assistance is free to the U.S. and does not require any
funding
.
Requirements for funding do not consider DoD expenditures
from an existing appropriation as an "incremental cost" of the
war, even if that expense represents a serious diversion of
resources from its original purpose. Equating funding
requirements with incremental costs is misleading if the
opportunity costs of diverted resources are greater than zero.
Although the opportunity costs of diverted resources are
difficult to measure precisely, they should at least be
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recognized. For ease of understanding, and to be consistent
with the way that Congress referred to the cost requests, this
thesis will distinguish between budgetary funding
requirements, referred to as "incremental costs, " and
incremental costs of the war for burden sharing
purposes, referred to as "burden sharing incremental costs".
It is important to note that DoD provided what they called
"full incremental costs" in the required monthly cost reports
and provided "incremental costs" in their specific requests
for supplemental funding. The major differences between the
two being that the supplemental requests only included costs
pertaining to that particular funding period (FY 92
Supplemental request did not include costs already covered in
FY 91 Supplemental) and the value of in-kind assistance
received was not added to the funding request.
Another important distinction must be made between total
costs and burden sharing incremental costs. For example,
under the Military Personnel (MILPERS) appropriation category,
full costs of the operation would include pay and allowances
for all military personnel involved in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, including those already on Active Duty
(AD) and those part-time Reserves called to AD. This "total"
cost does not reflect the additional cost specifically
attributable to the Persian Gulf. The burden sharing
incremental cost would include only those military personnel
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that were activated for duty specifically because of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
The debates over the differences in cost estimates and
reports have not been over total costs and burden sharing
incremental costs. Rather, they have centered on what was
included in cost estimates and cost reports as an "incremental
cost " of the war. The disparities result because of the lack
of guidance as to whether a true cost of the participation in
the Persian Gulf crisis was desired, or strictly a budgetary
justification of requirements for supplemental funding.
The differences in interpretations of "incremental" costs
that have caused the disparate cost estimates throughout the
operation can best be understood by separating U.S. costs into
four separate measures (See Figure 12 23 ) :
• Total costs (roughly estimated at $100 billion or more)
;
• Burden sharing incremental costs;
• Full incremental costs (roughly $61 billion in most
reports) ; and
• Incremental costs (supplemental funding requirements for
FY 90, 91, and 92 totalling roughly $49.6 billion).
Total costs are those costs incurred during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, regardless of whether they
ordinarily would have been incurred. GAO estimated these
costs to exceed $100 billion. Total costs are comprised of;
23 Source: Conahan, Frank C, GAO Testimony before the
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Figure 12. Clarification of Cost Categories
U.S. investment of about $50 billion to pay, equip and
otherwise maintain a force of 540,000 personnel; roughly $10
billion in other related costs such as the forgiveness of
foreign debt; and the DoD full incremental costs of the
operation.
DoD full incremental costs are costs that DoD would
otherwise not have incurred had it not been for the operation.
0MB reported these costs to be about $42.2 billion from August
1990 through May 1991. 0MB also estimates remaining costs,
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such as re-deployment, personnel costs and equipment repair
will be an additional $19 billion—bringing the full
incremental cost to roughly $61 billion.
Incremental funding requirement costs represent outlays
that the U.S. has made or will ultimately be required to make.
OMB reported incremental funding requirements for FY 91 and FY
92 to be $47.5 billion. FY 90 actual requirements were an
additional $2.1 billion, bringing the total to date to $49.6
billion.
Burden sharing incremental costs include all costs
attributed to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm that
otherwise would not have been incurred, regardless of funding
requirements. In addition to DoD full incremental costs,
opportunity costs and other non quantifiable costs are
included. [Ref . 12]
Perhaps the most popular example that highlights the
differences in the costs concerns DoD fuel costs. In its
September 1990 estimate of Desert Shield incremental costs,
DoD included increased fuel costs for its normal, non-Desert
Shield operations as part of its cost of Operation Desert
Shield. Although fuel costs of non-Desert Shield operations
would seem to be inappropriate to include for emergency
supplemental funding requirements, they do represent a cost
directly attributable to the Persian Gulf crisis and Iraqi
aggression and therefore should be counted in full incremental
costs of the operation.
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DoD cost estimates also assume that all equipment and
munitions lost in the conflict should be replaced (although
their cost reports and their supplemental requests did not)
.
In light of the austere defense budget climate facing DoD in
the future, clearly not all items will be replaced.
Therefore, those that will not should be excluded from funding
requirement reports. However, items destroyed do represent a
cost to the U.S. of participating in the war and should be
included in burden sharing incremental costs. However, these
resources should be valued on the basis of their opportunity
cost rather than their replacement cost.
The debate arises over what exactly to fund as replacement
cost. DoD has a category in its cost reports for "major end
items lost." In the case of the Navy A- 6 attack aircraft,
whose production line has stopped, the funding approved by
Congress is not the original cost of the A-6, but the cost of
a new F/A-18, determined to be an "equivalent replacement."
Conversely, funding for the loss of a Navy F-14 fighter
aircraft, another aircraft whose production line has been
terminated, was not allowed at all in any of the Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm supplementals
.
[Ref . 13]
Appendix C shows which Department of the Navy aviation line
items were or were not approved for the Desert Shield/Desert
Storm financing mechanisms.
It seems that the confusion over what should and should
not be included in the cost reports has never been resolved.
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Further, the fact that such inconsistencies exist points to
the conclusion that even the people making the final decisions
did not realize the subtleties of the differences.
There was obviously a failure to adequately describe the
ultimate purpose behind the required cost estimates and
reports. This may or may not have been intentional. It is
interesting to consider that sometimes it is in the
requestor' s best interest to intentionally omit the reason for
providing the cost estimates. DoD commands that know that the
estimates will be used for determining their efficiency, for
example, may have a tendency to report relatively lower costs.
On the other hand, if the known purpose is to determine how
much others should contribute towards footing the bill,
estimates may tend to be higher.
Regardless of the psychology behind the request for the
reports, different interpretations of what exactly should be
funded created many unnecessary disputes between government
agencies. A much more encompassing interpretation is most
appropriate for burden sharing purposes.
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B. DIFFICULTIES IN ESTIMATING U.S. COSTS 25
Assuming that the most appropriate costs for burden
sharing are more encompassing than the costs reflected in any
of the current cost estimates, it is important to consider
costs that should be included in a burden sharing incremental
cost estimate. For the most part, the full incremental costs
reported by DoD are very similar to burden sharing costs, with
a few notable exceptions.
1 . Quantifiable Costs
The cost reports reflect quantifiable, direct costs of
the war. The costs are the full incremental costs of the
operation as reported by DoD (including increased costs due to
increased oil prices) . It should be noted again that only a
portion of the full incremental costs are included in the
Defense supplemental appropriations. The cost reports also
include quantifiable costs of phasedown of operations and the
return home of deployed personnel and equipment. The direct
"There were several difficulties associated with
developing initial cost estimates throughout the evolution of
the war. Due primarily to the uncertainty as to the degree of
intensity that the crisis would entail, wide disparities were
seen in individual estimates. Assumptions that had to be made
as a baseline for these estimates, such as projected force
levels or duration of the conflict, were often completely
inaccurate in hindsight. This section of the thesis focuses
on detailing the difficulties behind measuring U.S. costs
appropriate for burden sharing purposes, and does not concern
itself with the methods used to develop cost estimates. The
development of methods for cost estimation is an interesting
subject best left to a separate study.
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costs in the cost reports are separated into Airlift , Sealift,
Personnel, Personnel Support , Operating Support, Fuel,
Procurement, and Military Construction (MILCON) . Refer to
Appendix A.
There are two major areas to address. The first area
concerns full incremental costs, as reflected in the cost
reports, appropriate to include as burden sharing incremental
costs, although difficult to measure. The second area
consists of costs appropriate for burden sharing purposes that
are not reflected in the cost reports. It is the latter area
this thesis focuses on. 25
The Personnel category warrants further discussion for
several reasons. The unique situations in many of its
subdivisions are significant for a burden sharing perspective.
Although the cost reports adequately reflected the different
costs incurred for Active Duty and Reserve troops, a burden
sharing perspective would demand that the entire compensation
should adequately reflect opportunity costs.
For Reservists, because they and their employers were
aware of the inherent risk of being recalled to service, and
could (should) have planned ahead for this type of
eventuality, opportunity cost would equate to reserve military
25 Discussion on incremental budgetary costs can be found
in "Cost Estimation of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm:
A Budgetary Analysis" by Lcdr. Andrew Johnson, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December, 1991.
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pay, and not civilian pay foregone. However, opportunity cost
for stop-gap forces is quite different.
Implementation of the stop-loss policy retained
personnel unexpectedly. Their opportunity cost is best
measured by the salary they would have earned outside the
military. The incremental burden sharing costs for these
personnel are therefore greater than just the increasing costs
for basic pay, subsistence, and housing allowances for
retaining these troops beyond their scheduled separation date.
Another significant issue within Personnel is the
potential cost increase from the scaling back of reductions in
military forces that the Administration had proposed. CBO
analysis shows that by 1995 annual operating costs would
increase by $10 to $12 billion because of smaller force
reductions than originally planned. [Ref . 14]
Additionally, if funding for procurement of major equipment
was increased because of the smaller reduction in forces, the
additional costs could be substantially larger. Figure 13 26
shows the effects on the U.S. defense structure under original
and reduced defense cuts.
If the decision to scale back force reductions was
made as a direct result of Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, the additional costs should be included in a burden
sharing incremental cost estimate.
26 Source: Reischauer, Robert D., CBO Testimony before
the House Budget Committee, February 27, 1991.
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Figure 13. Increased Costs From Smaller Force Reductions
Additional recruitment costs due to a perception that
service in the military is now a higher risk and because of
the attention focused on the large economic hardships suffered
by activated Reservists is also an opportunity cost
attributable to the conflict . Many personnel had not
anticipated the extent to which they would be called upon to
shoulder the burden. The heretofore seemingly free-ride of
remaining in the Reserves and collecting pay may now not be
worth the risks to many personnel. On the other hand, this
effect may be offset by the overwhelming success of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the resulting increase in
patriotism and enhanced reputation of the military.
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Finally, numerous civilians worked overtime as a
result of the Gulf War. For people receiving overtime pay,
this pay has been inherently agreed upon to reflect their
opportunity cost. However, for people on salaries, their
opportunity cost would be the value of their time.
As is especially apparent in matters of pay, measuring
appropriate incremental and opportunity costs is extremely
difficult. But these issues underscore the importance of
accounting for these economic concepts in burden sharing cost
estimates
.
Procurement was another category with inadequate
guidance that warrants further discussion. In addition to
concerns over the replacement value of equipment, Congress
also expressed concern that DoD was trying to "get well" by
submitting funding requests in the supplementals that would
not only replace the lost systems, but would also recoup other
hidden costs and fund major improvements and upgrades as well.
The most critical distinction to be made here is the
difference between the budgetary cost for items that were not
going to be replaced, and the opportunity cost of those items.
DoD reported its full incremental cost of major end items lost
in its cost reports. This did not mean that they fully
expected to get all of these costs funded. In fact, OMB
estimated the full incremental cost at $61 billion, whereas
their supplemental requests through FY 92 were only $49.6
billion. [Ref . 15]
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The appropriate cost measure is marginal production
cost of resources used or destroyed or of their "equivalent
replacements", as discussed previously. However, if the U.S.
were to decide, directly as a result of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, to increase our arsenal of some weapons
or munitions, this would be a marginal cost attributable
directly to the operation and must be included for burden
sharing purposes
.
There are several categories of quantifiable costs
that are omitted from the monthly cost reports. Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) is an area of
quantifiable costs not included in the monthly cost reports.
RDT&E costs include items identified as priority for rapid
deployment. The opportunity costs of canceling and postponing
lower priority items should also be considered to determine
the true cost of the process.
The costs of maintaining a presence in the Persian
Gulf and restocking pre-positioned supplies that have been
drawn down over the course of the war should also be
determined for burden sharing incremental cost estimates.
Assuming a shift in U.S. defense policy towards regional
conflicts, prepositioning of equipment offers important
advantages and the additional costs must be reflected when
tallying the costs resulting from U.S. participation in the
Persian Gulf.
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Other quantifiable costs not included in the cost
reports are reconstruction aid, aid to other countries, and
security costs to the United States. Although aid to foreign
countries is significant, as has been discussed above, the
increase in U.S. expenditures on security because of terrorist
threats to U.S. firms and citizens also warrants inclusion in
burden sharing cost estimates. Although it is difficult to
determine which acts of terrorism are directly a result of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the increased security
costs should certainly be included. [Ref . 16]
2 . Offsets
There are a number of offsets to the incremental cost
of the operation that also complicate cost estimation. Some
are immediate, such as canceled training exercises; others are
longer term, such as purchasing equipment now rather than
later. The unknown value of many of these offsets make it
difficult to estimate the operation' s incremental
costs. [Ref. 17]
There are basically three types of offsets:
Expenditures that DoD planned to make in FY 91 but canceled
because of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm; supplies
purchased during the operation that will not have to be bought
later (stockpiling) ; and in-kind assistance that defrays the
costs of the operation, as discussed above.
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3 . Non-Quantifiable Costs28
There are several costs that the U.S. suffered
directly or indirectly as a result of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm that cannot be quantified. For example,
the U.S. spent valuable political capital all over the world
to maintain the allied coalition and raise funds for support.
The U.S. may have a more difficult time with trade agreements
after asking Japan, Germany, and Korea for contributions to
the war effort to which many of their citizens were
opposed. [Ref. 18] Any deterioration of the U.S.
bargaining position would result in an opportunity cost for
the U.S.
Other non-quantifiable issues are: the hardships
suffered by many rural U.S. communities due to the loss of
doctors and health care professionals activated to the
Reserves (although this should already be included as part of
the opportunity cost of being in the Reserves) ; the lost
attention of the President to other important domestic issues
as a result of focusing on the war effort; the financial
crisis for several U.S. industries (e.g., the U.S. airlines
suffered higher fuel prices, higher insurance premiums, and
fewer airline bookings) ; and finally, the war has made it
possible for President Bush to increase his standing in public
opinion polls without responding to the domestic problems of
28 This section based heavily on "Costs of the U.S. War
with Iraq", James P. Love, February 5, 1991, Public Citizen.
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diminishing educational opportunities in the lack of
significant increases in real wages. The opportunity cost of
de-emphasis of social concerns is a cost that is not captured
elsewhere.
These non-quantifiable costs may cause effects even
larger than the more quantifiable costs identified above, but
they are excluded from nearly all cost estimates of the war
because they are so difficult to measure.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Understanding Economic Concepts Is Critical
This thesis has accepted the challenge of applying
economic concepts to real world events. Application of
economic principles in the public arena is often extremely
difficult. NATO, for instance, does not use the concept of
marginal costs to measure a country' s NATO contribution
because the members decided it was impossible to determine
which troops or resources were specifically attributable to
NATO (e.g., U.S. troops in Germany; U.S. troops in the U.S.
that are designated as NATO reinforcements; other U.S. troops,
home and foreign-based, that can be re-deployed to NATO if
necessary; U.S. reserves that can be recalled to assist NATO;
etc.). Although economic principles are desirable, they are
often difficult to apply.
Politics also complicates the application of economic
principles. For example, assuming that fuel price increases
resulted from our decision to intervene in Kuwait, the entire
impact on DoD' s fuel costs is a marginal cost of the
operation. However, an issue of political fairness arises
over the decision of whether or not to let DoD recapture these
costs when other Federal agencies, like DoT, cannot.
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Despite the difficulty with using economic concepts to
explain events, a firm understanding of these principles is an
absolute necessity for an intelligent discussion of burden
sharing in defense alliances. Application of the economic
concepts discussed in this thesis is something that decision
makers should strive for in future burden sharing issues.
2 . Measuring Equity Is Difficult
Although concern about free riding makes measuring
equity politically attractive, precise measurement of relative
contributions and benefits is impossible.
a. Appropriate Use Of Proxies Is Imperative
To help alleviate this problem, quantifiable
proxies have historically been used to assess equity.
However, the options of using various inputs and outputs opens
the door to a strategic choice of proxies to manipulate data
and support a desired political view. This thesis, as one of
its major contributions, attempted to clarify the
misconceptions of the oil security benefit, and has proposed
a more appropriate proxy to use when assessing oil security
benefit issues. Because of the instability of the Persian
Gulf region, the oil supply security benefit will very likely
be of significant interest again in the future.
Jb. Equity Formulas Are Not Necessary
One of the most notable discoveries made during
research for this thesis was the lack of any established
67
burden sharing methodologies to determine appropriate amounts
for allied nations to pledge for financial assistance. Rough
guesses seemed to be the accepted methodology for burden
sharing contributions, so this thesis had no explicit
methodologies to evaluate for equity reasonableness. Although
the Washington Post referred to a burden sharing formula that
called for Japan to provide 20% of the cost, the U.S. and
other allies to provide 20%, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to
provide 60%, supporting documentation confirming the actual
existence of such a formula could not be found. [Ref . 19] In
fact, an interview with an official in the OSD International
Economic and Energy Affairs Office, who accompanied Secretary
of State Baker on the "Tin Cup" mission to the Persian Gulf,
indicated that such a formula was never used.
Failure to develop a numerically based ratio to
define equitable burden sharing is no reason to despair. No
one has ever developed a generally accepted measure yet.
However, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm may have come
close. Analysis of the contributions and benefits after the
fact, (specifically noting the ratios of final contributions
as opposed to initial pledges) shows no individual country
adamantly complaining. The acquiescence of all of the
coalition members may imply that an acceptable ratio was
found.
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3 . Burden Sharing Incremental Costs Are More Inclusive
The important distinction between incremental costs
that reflect requests for supplemental funding and the far
more inclusive burden sharing incremental costs of the
operation that reflect the true cost of U.S. involvement in
the operation should now be clear. Clarifying exactly which
type costs are desired for reports in future coalition
contingencies should be done immediately at the outset to
avoid confusion like that which occurred in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm reporting requirements over the various
interpretations of "incremental costs".
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
There are several ways for the U.S. to be more prepared
for burden sharing arrangements that are certain to occur with
future regional conflicts and multinational coalitions.
1 . Realize the Uniqueness of the Operation26
The degree of international backing for all aspects of
the Persian Gulf crisis was unprecedented. Burden sharing
arrangements in the Persian Gulf were developed relatively
easily because Saddam Hussein was the ideal enemy.
International lack of trust and Hussein' s historical
immorality made him politically easy to join forces against.
28 This section based heavily on "Iraq/Kuwait Crisis: The
International Response and Burdensharing Issues", Gary J.
Pagliano, CRS Report, August 19, 1991.
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Arab countries with close trading relations with Iraq took
domestic political risks with their cooperation, but the
political costs for other countries of supporting the U.N.
sanctions against Iraq were minimal. For only this reason
alone, it was far easier to attain the participation of such
a large number of countries in the coalition. This tremendous
degree of political support from the United Nations, the
Soviet Union, Arab countries, and NATO members was critical to
the effectiveness of the trade embargo and Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.
Many countries also had additional reasons, such as
common economic interests in the region, but without such an
ideal political enemy, forming such an extensive, supportive
coalition would have been much more difficult.
Saddam Hussein also cooperated by being an ideally
incompetent military leader. The U.S. military looked
perfectly prepared for its overwhelmingly successful air and
ground attacks in January and February of 1991. This created
the impression that the defense budget could certainly afford
to be reduced. However, it must be considered, that if
Hussein had continued his invasion through Kuwait into Saudi
Arabia in August, the outcome could have been considerably
different. It is hard to believe that the U.S. was given
enough time to more than double its troop strength by the time
70
the first major ground confrontations began in the end of
January. 29 More than 700,000 coalition air, ground, and
naval personnel were in the theater of operations, and more
than 110 coalition combatant ships were
participating. [Ref . 21]
Even for the remaining nations that were still
deliberating over the political and economic reasons to join
the coalition, Hussein's decision to dump roughly 460 million
gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf made it justifiable
environmentally to join in the fight against this deplorable
enemy
.
Sharing the risks, roles, and responsibilities in the
efforts against Iraq was almost more of a privilege than a
burden. Allied pledges for contributions amount to enough to
completely fund the U.S. full incremental cost of the war if
the pledges are fulfilled. This capacity and willingness of
other countries to share the costs of the conflict is far
greater than that after any previous wars. There were little,
if any, disadvantages to supporting the coalition. Clearly,
these optimal conditions for establishing burden sharing
arrangements are much too ideal to hope for in future regional
conflicts. This remarkable international support for sharing
29 In the first major ground confrontation, Iraq mounted
a four-pronged raid across the Kuwaiti border. Near Al Wafra,
U.S. and coalition forces engaged a mechanized battalion with
Cobra gunships and fixed-wing aircraft. They repulsed the
attack, destroying ten enemy tanks. (ALL HANDS, No. 8 95, 1991)
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the roles, risks, and responsibilities of the collective
burden is unlikely to occur again.
2 . Stress An Equitable Process
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm has been another
example proving that measuring disproportionality ex post is
impossible. Therefore, the burden sharing debate should be
refocused from measuring outcomes to establishing a fair
process. If all coalition members would agree that a process
is fair, measuring the outcome becomes unnecessary. For
example,
"The firemen at a local fire station play basketball, ping
pong and other games to decide who washes the dishes.
Because they agree the process is fair, they don't have to
track how many times each individual washes the
dishes. " [Ref. 22]
At present, there are no formal (or informal)
agreements between the U.S. and its allies that prepare us for
these operations. It is essential that the U.S. look beyond
implementing a cease fire and begin negotiating more permanent
security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, as well as the
other regions of the world. Disproportionality should be
addressed through institutional changes that alter coalition
members' incentives
.
[Ref . 23] Establishing a model
for a more equitable way to share defense burdens would be an
ideal subject for a future thesis.
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3 . Remember The Lessons Learned From The Operation
The general feeling about Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm in July, 1991, only three months after the
formal U.N. cease-fire ended the Persian Gulf War, was that
the operation (and the financial hoops that had to be jumped
through) was old news. Capitol Hill and the Pentagon are
hectic places, and if an issue no longer warrants "front-page
coverage", it is often relegated to the bottom of the pile
under the newer "priorities". It was clear in July that the
Pentagon, and especially Capitol Hill, had moved on to other
issues. As a result, personnel had already been changed to
tasks in other areas of interest and were difficult, if not
impossible, to contact.
Assuming that this type of regional conflict and ad
hoc coalition is so likely to face the U.S. in the future,
ignoring the lessons learned from the operation would be a
travesty. The U.S. should compare the various procedures and
methodologies used to develop the cost estimates and cost
reports for the operation against each other. Decisions
should be made on the best methodologies for particular
scenarios. This could significantly reduce the unnecessary
duplication of effort that occurred in the initial stages of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The differences between
the Army, Navy (including Marine Corps) and Air Force
processes to capture incremental costs added unnecessary
confusion and cost additional time. The next contingency that
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the U.S. will face will doubtfully give the advantage of six
months for which to prepare.
The efficient and effective parts of the process must
be "put into stone" to provide a firm standardized system
throughout DoD and the other federal agencies from which to
progress in the future.
4 . Respond To The Changing Threat
The main threat, for the first time in over forty
years, is no longer the Soviet Union. Declining defense
budgets indicate that the majority of Members of Congress feel
that the threat, whatever that may be, is less than it was
before the end of the Cold War. Whether this is true is
debatable.
As we enter into the "New World Order, " hot off the
impressive flexing of U.S. military muscle over Iraq's forces,
the U.S. must be cautious not to underestimate the need for
military strength. Although the Soviet threat may be
decreasing, the new threats on the horizon, as evidenced by
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, may loom even larger (or at the
least more complex and expensive) . As Congressman Les Aspin
stated,
*
"We will have to deal with regional powderkegs like the
invasion of Kuwait. We will face weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of international thugs who would
use them. We will face adversaries who are stateless and
who may be impossible to deter with the threat of
retaliation. These threats we face today will profoundly
shape our defense tomorrow. " [Ref. 23]
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If a crisis occurred somewhere in the world with much
less notice than was the case with Iraq, and if the sufficient
number of troops and ships were not already deployed overseas
to be able to handle the problem, there would be a very
significant delay before they could be made available.
The Administration's planned defense cutbacks will
result in this very lack of availability. The smaller forces
planned by the Administration could probably sustain the same
type of deployment, but with a great deal of strain and only
for a limited amount of time.
DoD is facing an austere budget climate. Although
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm may be of some help in
keeping the defense budget healthier a bit longer by possibly
postponing some of the defense cuts, it seems inevitable that
the budget will eventually keep declining. Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm highlighted the weaknesses within current
U.S. military capabilities to respond to the "new threat".
The Administration should increase its capability to transport
military weapons and supplies to crisis areas and its pre-
positioning of weapons and supplies near areas of likely
conflicts. With the proposed budget cuts, and the planned
decrease in numbers of ships and other major end items, the
U.S. must focus on increasing capability and quality to be
ready for future contingencies. DoD, and the Navy in
particular, will have to make major changes in its plans.
Whatever may be the end result, it is clear that the focus on
75
what the U.S. military forces need and can afford must begin
now.
5 . Conserve Energy30
"Iraq's invasion of Kuwait marks the third time in less
than twenty years that a disruption in oil supplies from
the Middle East has increased inflation temporarily and
pushed this country into recession. " [Ref. 25]
Although some analysts believe that the Middle East
may be somewhat more stable than it was before Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the historical political
instability in the region makes the risk of more disruptions
very possible. Therefore, disruptions to the U.S. economy
because of an increasing dependence on Persian Gulf oil are
also very possible.
The U.S. must take advantage of any available measures
(e.g., collective security agreements) in the future that will
enhance the stability of the Gulf region. Although the
overall oil supply security benefit was greatly overstated,
and significant long run increase in oil prices is unlikely,
we need to guard against short term politically motivated
fluctuations, such as recently witnessed. The U.S. should
take measures now to reduce its dependence on imported energy
30 This discussion is based heavily on CBO Testimony by
Richard Reischauer before the House Ways and Means Committee,
March 6, 1991, and "Costs of the U.S. War with Iraq", James P.
Love, Public Citizen, February 5, 1991.
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products, especially from such instable areas, to increase the
overall U.S. energy security.
C . SUMMARY33
The Persian Gulf War gave the United States an
unprecedented opportunity to establish methodologies and
procedures to estimate costs, collect contributions, and
evaluate the benefits of participation in an ad hoc coalition.
The lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
will provide significant insights for implementing processes
for future U.S. responses to regional conflicts and burden
sharing agreements.
As indicative of the future, in crises that affect
numerous countries by the disturbance of world oil prices or
by the formation of U.N. -sanctioned trade embargoes, a sharing
of the costs is likely to occur again. As illustrated by four
decades of successful deterrence on the European land mass,
and now again in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. assumption of the
burden of leadership will be essential to effectively organize
collective efforts for a broad international response with
trade, aid, finance, and military components
.
[Ref. 25]
With the overwhelming success of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, it is absolutely crucial that the
33 Concluding statements based on "Iraq/Kuwait Crisis:
The International Response and Burden Sharing Issues", CRS
Report by Gary J. Pagliano, August 19, 1991.
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negotiated agreements for continued sharing of the political,
economic and military costs of the operation is maintained.
Not only maintained until the cease-fire details are
implemented and final war-related costs are reconciled for
this specific conflict, but for establishing more permanent
collective security arrangements within the Gulf region.
This mandatory emphasis on burden sharing arrangements
will undoubtedly be of significant value for ad hoc coalition
contingencies in the future. The rapidly changing military,
political, and economic conditions require the U.S. look now
at more cost-effective and equitably shared changes in defense
roles, risks, and responsibilities, while adjusting U.S.
political goals, defense posture and economic burdens to
maintain credible nuclear and conventional deterrent to the
threats of the "New World Order. " [Ref . 26]
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APPENDIX A
OMB MONTHLY COST REPORT, SEPTEMBER 16, 1991
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THE DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050.1
September 16, 1991
Honorable J. Danforth Quayle
President: of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 2 0510
Dear Mr. President:
Enclosed is the seventh report on United States Costs in the
Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such
Costs, as required by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25. This report
was prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other
appropriate government officials. Previous reports have covered
the costs and contributions for the period beginning August 1,
1990, and ending on June 30, 1991, for costs, and July 31, 1991,
for contributions.
In accord with the legal requirement, this report provides
the following information:
o the Incremental costs associated with Operation Desert
Storm that were incurred during July 1991;
o the cumulative total of such costs, by fiscal year, from
August 1, 1990, to July 31, 1991;
o the costs that are nonrecurring costs, offset by in-kind
contributions, or offset by the realignment,
rcprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for
activities unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict;
the amount of contributions made to the United Stater, by
each foreign country during August 1991, as well as the
cumulative total of such contributions. The report
specifies the amount of cash payments pledged and
received, provides a description and value of in-kind
contributions pledged and received, and identifies
restrictions on the use of such contributions.
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The costs reported to this point should be viewed as partial
and preliminary for reasons noted in the enclosure. As required
by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25, an eighth report will be submitted
by October 15th. In accord with the legal requirement, it will
cover incremental costs associated with Operation Desert Storm
that were incurred in August 1991, and foreign contributions for
September 1991. Subsequent reports will be submitted by the 15th
day of each month, as required, and will revise preliminary
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UNITED STATES COSTS IN THE PERSTAN GULE CONFLICT AND
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO OFFSET SUCH COSTS
Report #7: September 15, 1991
Section 401 of P.L. 102-25 requires a series of reports on
incremental costs associated with Operation Desert Storm and on
foreign contributions to offset such costs. This is the seventh
of such reports. As required by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25, it
covers costs incurred during July 1991 and contributions made
during August 1991. Previous reports have covered the costs and
contributions for the period beginning August 1, 1990, and ending




The costs covered in this and subsequent reports are full
incremental costs of Operation Desert Storm. These are
additional costs resulting directly from the Persian Gulf crisis
(i.e., costs that would not otherwise have been incurred). It
should be noted that only a portion of full incremental costs are
included in Defense supplemental appropriations. These portions
are costs that require financing in fiscal year 1991 or fiscal
year 1992 and that are exempt from statutory Defense budget
ceilings. Not included in fiscal year 1991 or fiscal year 1992
appropriations are items of full incremental costs such as
August-September 1990 costs and costs covered by in-kind
contributions from allies.
Table 1 summarizes preliminary estimates of Department of
Defense full incremental costs associated with Operation Desert
Storm from August 1, 1990, through July 31, 1991. The cost
information is shown by the cost and financing categories
specified in Section 401 of P.L. 102-25. Tables 2-9 provide more
detailed information by cost category. Costs shown in this
report were developed by the Department of Defense and are based
on the most recent data available.
Through July 1991, costs of $45.3 billion were reported by
the Department of Defense. The costs reported so far are
preliminary. This report includes an estimate of costs
identified to date of equipment repair, rehabilitation, and
maintenance caused by the high operating rates and combat use.
The report also includes some of the costs of phasedown of
operations and the return home of the deployed forces.
While a substantial portion of the costs have been reported,
incremental costs are being and wi]l continue to be incurred in
subsequent months. These include equipment repair,
rehabilitation, and restoration th<it have not so far been
identified, long-term benefit and disability costs, and the costs
of continuing operations in the region. About 42,000 military
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personnel were in the region at the end of July, and
approximately 28,000 reservist?; were still on active duty at that
time. Significant progress has been made in returning equipment
from Southwest Asia; however, considerable amounts of materiel,
equipment, ammunition and vehicles still had not been shipped
from the area at the end of July. Materiel still in theater
includes some large, heavy pieces of equipment which are costly
and time consuming to prepare and transport. Combat aircraft
continue to fly in the region and the U.S. forces will continue
to remain in the region until all parties are satisfied with long
term security arrangements. The costs through July plus the
other costs not yet reported are expected by the Department of
Defense to result in total incremental costs of over $61 billion.
Incremental Coast Guard costs of $6 million were incurred
during this reporting period, with cumulative costs of $34
million through July to support military operations in the
Persian Gulf.
£pn t r i bu t i on s
Section 401 of P.L. 102-25 requires that this report include
the amount of each country's contribution during the period
covered by the report, as well as the cumulative total of such
contributions. Cash and in-kind contributions pledged and
received are to be specified.
Tables lo and ll list foreign contributions pledged in 1990
and 1991, respectively, and amounts received in August. Cash and
in-kind contributions are separately specified.
As of September 11, 1991, foreign countries contributed
$8.0 billion of the $9.7 billion pledged in calendar year 1990,
and $39.9 billion of the $44.2 billion pledged in calendar year
1991. Of the total $48.0 billion received, $42.5 billion was in
cash and $5.5 billion was in-kind assistance (including food,
fuel, water, building materials, transportation, and support
equipment) . Table 12 provides further details on in-kind
contributions
.
Table 13 summarizes the current status* of commitments and
contributions received through September 12, 1991.
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Future Reports
As required by Section 401 of P.Ii. 102-25, the next report
will be submitted by October 15th. In accord with the legal
requi rement , it will cover incremental costs associated with
Operation Desert Storm that were incurred in August 1991, and
foreign contributions for September 199).. Subsequent reports
will be submitted by the 15th day of each month, as required, and
will revise pre] iminary reports to reflect additional costs as
they are estimated or re-estimated.
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INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates






Aug - Sep Oct - June July
38
through July July 1991
412 2,303 2,341 2.753
(2) Sealift 235 3.474 39 3,513 3,748
(3) Personnel 223 4,946 228 5,174 5,397
(4) Personnel Support 352 5,340 228 5,569 5,920
(5) Operating Support 1.210 12,268 670 12,938 14.148
(6) Fuel 626 3,715 217 3,932 4,558
(7) Procurement 129 8,275 43 8,318 8,447
(8) Military Construction 11 355
!
355 366
Total 3,197 40,676 1,463 42,139 45,336 2/
I6\
Nonrecurring costs M S




In-kind contributions 225 5.113 116 5.229 5,454
Realignment 4/ 913 116 116 1.029
1/ Data was compiled by OMB. Source of data — Department of Defense. This report adjusts earlier
estimates to reflect more complete accounting information.
2/ The costs reported so far are preliminary. This report includes an estimate of costs identified to date
of equipment repair, rehabilitation, and maintenance caused by the high operating rales and combat
use. Additional costs for these categories will be reported as more information becomes available.
The report also includes some of the costs of phasedown of operations and the return home of the
deployed forces. However, certain long-term benefit and disability costs have not been reflected in
the estimates. Those costs will be reported in later reports. The costs through July plus the other
costs not yet reported arc expected by the Department of Defense to result in total incremental costs
of slightly more than $61 billion.
3/ Nonrecurring costs include investment costs associated with procurement and Military Construction,
as well as other one-time costs such as the activation of the Ready Reserve Force ships.
4/ This includes the realignment, rcprogramming. or transfer of funds appropriated for activities




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
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1/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming. or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.




The previous October-June estimate has been reduced by S58 million due to a recatcgorlzation of
certain costs to operating support.
During this period over 500 redeployment missions were flown, returning over 12,000 people and




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense













































Nonrecurring costs included above 57 1,100 2 1,102 1.159
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 2 138 4 142 144
Realignment 1/ 2 2
1/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category' Includes costs related to the transportation by sea of personnel, equipment and
supplies.
During this period a total of 57 ships (22 of them foreign (lag ships) made redeployment




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense



































Total 223 5.174 5.397





1/ This Includes ihe realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category includes pay and allowances of members of the reserve components of the Armed
Forces called or ordered to active duty and the increased pay and allowances of members of the regular
components of the Armed Forces incurred because of deployment In connection with Operation Desert
Storm.
The previous October-June estimate has been reducecj by $102 million due to a recalculation of Air
Force reserve costs.





INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
FY1990 FY 1991 Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Personnel Support
Aug - Sep Oct - June July through July July 1991
209 4.055 33 4,088 4,297Army
Navy 104 849 59 908 1.013
Air Force 24 389 134 523 646
Intelligence Agencies 2 9 1/ 10 12
Defense Logistics Agency 12 16 1 16 28
Defense Mapping Agency 5 1 6 6
Special Operations Command 2 8 1/ 8 9
Office of the Secretary of Defense 9 1 10 10
Total 352 5.340 228 5.569 5.920












1/ Costs are less than $500 thousand.
2/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gull conflict.
This category includes subsistence, uniforms and medical costs.




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1. 1990 Through July 31. 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
FY 1990 FY 1991 Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990-
Operating SupporJ
Aug - Sep Oct - June July through July Juty 1991
Army B9G 6.909 558 7.467 8.363
Navy 223 3.131 21 3.152 3.375
Air Force 68 2.144 83 2,227 2.295
Intelligence Agencies 1 1/ 1 1
Special Operations Command 15 29 7 35 51
Defonsc Communications Agency 1 1 1
Defense Mapping Agency 8 48 1 49 57
Defonsc Nuclear Agency 2 1/
,
2 2
Office of the Secretary of Defense 3 3 3
Total 1.210 12.288 670 12.938 14.148
Nonrecurring costs included above 922 922 922
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 167 1.631 45 1.676 1.843
Realignment 2/ 698 69 69 767
1/ Costs are loss than $500 thousand.
2/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category includes equipment support costs, costs associated with increased operational
tempo, spare parts, stock fund purchases, communications, and equipment maintenance.
The previous October-June estimate has been Increased by $143 million. This increase is for higher
In-country operation costs.




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1. 1990 Through July 31 , 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
FY 1990 FY 1901 Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990-
Fuel
Aug - Sep Oct -June July through July Juty 1991
Army 10 148 16 164 174
Navy 19 1,134 98 1,232 1,251
Air Force 137 2,422 102 2.524 2,661
Special Operations Command 10 1 12 12
Defense Logistics Agency 460 460
Total 626 3,715 217 3,932 4,558
Nonrecurring costs Included above
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 21 1,176 46 1,222 1,243
Realignment 1/ 60 60
1/ This Includes the realignment, reprogrammlng. or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category Includes the additional fuel required for higher operating tempo and for airlift and
sealift transportation of personnel and equipment as well as for the higher prices for fuel during the
period.
*
The previous October-June estimate has been decreased by $212 million to reflect a credit for fuel
which had been charged to Navy but which had in fact been provided as asslstance-ln-klnd.
About 75 percent of the costs reported during this period were due to higher prices for fuel with the




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incunod by the Department of Defense
From August 1. 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
FY 1990 FY 1991 Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Procurement
Aug - Sep Oct - Juno July
42
through July July 1991
49 2.351 2,393 2,442Army
Navy 47 2,415 2,415 2,462
Air Force 32 3,372 3,372 3.404
Intelligence Agencies 1 12 1 13 13
Defense Communications Agency 1/ 1/
Special Operations Command 99 99 99
Defense Logistics Agency 4 4 4
Defense Mapping Agency 1 1 1
Defense Nuclear Agency 1/ 1/
Defense Systems Project Office 1 1 1
Office of the Secretary of Defense 21 21 21
Total 129 8,275 43 1/ 8,318 8.447
Nonrecurring costs included above 129 8,275 43 1/ 8,318 8,447
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 124 124 124 -
Realignment 2/ 119 47 47 165
1/ Costs are less than $500 thousand.
2/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming. or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict. *
This category includes ammunition, weapon systems improvements and upgrades, and equipment
purchases.
The previous October - June estimates have boon decreased by $21 million to reflect reestimates of
equipment provided as asslstanco-ln-kind.
;
The costs for July result primarily from the loss of Army combat vehicles during a fire at Doha. Kuwait
on July 17th and finalization of Army contracts for purchase of special purpose equipment to facilitate




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense



























Total 11 355 366













1/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This categoiy includes the cost of constructing temporary billets for troops, and administiativc and
supply and maintenance facilities.
There was a decrease In the previously reported Army October-June costs due to a recstimato by























































1/ Data was compiled by OMB. Sources of data: commitments — Defense, State, and Treasury;
cash received — Treasury; receipts and value of in-kind assistance — Defense.
2/ This is reimbursement for enrouto transportation ihrough December for the second deployment and for
U.S. In-theater expenses for food, building materials, fuel, and support. Bills for reimbursement have
boon forwarded to Saudi Arabia.
3/ 1990 cash contributions wore for transportation and associated costs.
4/ An accounting of In-kind assistance accepted by U.S. forces Is under way. It Is expected that this
accounting will conclude that the German commitment has boon fully mot.







































































1/ Data was compiled by OMB. Sources of data: commitments — Defense. State, and Treasury;
cash received — Treasury; receipts and value of in-kind assistance — Defense.
2/ 1991 commitments In most instances did not distinguish between cash and in-kind. The commitment
shown'above reflects actual in-kind assistance received unless specific information is available.
3/ 1991 cash contributions are for logistics and related support.
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Table 12
DESCRIPTION OF IN-KIND ASSISTANCE RECEIVED
TO OFFSET U.S. COSTS AS OF AUGUST 31, 1991
($ in millions)
SAUDI ARABIA
Host nation support Including food, fuel, housing, building




Fuel, food and water, security services, construction
equipment and civilian labor.
GERMANY
Vehicles including cargo trucks, water trailers, buses
and ambulances; generators; radios; portable showers;
protective masks, and chemical sensing vehicles
japan ;
Construction and engineering support, vehicles, electronic
data processing, telephone services, medical equipment,
and transportation.
KOREA
Transportation and replenishment stocks
BAHRAIN
Medical supplies, food and water
OMAN/QATAR


























FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED IN 1990 AND 1991 TO OFFSET U.S. COSTS










GCC STATES 6,845 30.088 36.933 27.112 4.073 3L.185 5,748
SAUDI ARABIA 3,339 13,500 16.839 10.052 3,819 13,871 2,968
KUWAIT 2,506 13,500 16.006 13.190 36 13,226 2.781
UAE 1,000 3,088 4,088 3,870 218 4.088
GERMANY 1,072 5,500 6.572 5.772 782 6,554 18 3/
JAPAN 1,740 8,332 10,072 9,416 571 9,987 85 4/
KOREA 80 275 355 150 71 221 134
OTHER 3 23 26 4 22 26
TOTAL 9,740 44,218 53.958 42,454 5.519 47,973 5,985
1/ Data was compiled by OMB. Sources of data: commitments — Defense, State, and Treasury;
cash received — Treasury; receipts and value of in-kind assistance — Defense.
2/ Cash receipts are as of September 12, 1991. In-kind assistance is as of August 31, 1991.
3/ An accounting of in-kind asslstanco accepted by U.S forces Is under way. It Is expected
that this accounting will conclude that the German commitment has been fully met.
4/ Resolution of balance is under discussion and should be resolved shortly.
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APPENDIX B
1. Description of In-Kind Assistance by Country
($ in millions, as of January 31, 1991)
Saudi Arabia: (Host nation support including food, fuel, housing,
building materials, transportation and port handl'"° *•««'«»«» ^ling services.) $1,566
Germany: (Vehicles including cargo trucks, water trailers, buses and
ambulances; generators, radios, portable showers and protective
masks.) 531
Japan: (Construction and engineering support, vehicles, electronic
data processing, telephone services, and medical equipment.) 457
United Arab Emirates: (Fuel, food and water, security services,
construction equipment and civilian labor) 140
Korea: (Transportation) 21
Kuwait: (Transportation) 10
Other: (Water, medical services, and transportation)
TOTAL $2,728
2. Description of In-Kind Assistance by Type of Service or Product
($ in millions, as of January 31, 1991)
Fuel $836
Food / potable water 641
Vehicles 354
Construction 275
Equipment, facilities and services 214
Transportation * 59
Electronic data processing 23
Warehouse facilities 28
Housing and utilities 59
Telephone and communication services 40
Utilities 13
Other (medical, airport services, security services; civilian labor,





Desert Shield/Storm Financing Cost of Combat ($ in mi llion)










l A-6 (repl w/F/A-18) 108.0 108.0
2 AV-8 230.0 230.0
3 F-14 55.0 55.0
4 F/A-18 135.0 135.0
5 OV-10 13.0 13.0
6 AH-1 18.0 18.0
7 UH-1 8.0 8.0
8 CH-46 21.0 21.0
9 SH-60 17.0 17.0




12 F/A-18/AWW-9A mods 1.7 1.7




15 S-3 mods'ARC- 162 radio 0.3 0.3













21 H-3 mods/troop seats 0.2 0.2
22 H-3 mods/night vision
goggles
0.3 0.3




25 Spares/C-130 engines 16.0 16.0
26 Initial spares 32.6 32.6
27 Replenishment spares 36.5 * 36.5
28 CPC/aerial cameras 3.4 3.4




31 CGE/MPEAMS 9.4 9.4
32 CGETOPSCENE 1.4 1.4
33 CGE/spotting dollys 0.7 0.7
34 CGE/canopy covers 0.1 0.1
35 Magic Lantern 9.2 -9.2
36 Total 747.3 25.2 126.3 508.0 87.8
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